I'm currently a PhD candidate in the Harvard University philosophy department. I hold a BA in philosophy from Yale University and an MPhil in philosophy from Cambridge University. I've also been a visiting student at the University of California, Berkeley.
I have research interests in ethics, moral psychology, and early modern philosophy. My dissertation is about what blame is, when (if ever) it's deserved, and what (if anything) it's good for. In it, I defend - to the extent that I can - the commonsense intuition that blame is only justified in response to things that are under a person's voluntary control.
I am a PhD student in Philosophy at Texas A&M University, working in philosophy of emotion, value theory, moral psychology, and philosophy of mind. I have earned both a BA and an MA in Philosophy from Peking University, China.
My dissertation focuses on how emotions and values are related. I have been working on discrete emotions such as amusement and boredom as case studies. By continuing applying interdisciplinary works from social psychology, history, and cultural studies, I hope to give an account that explains value in terms of what the subject sees fitting, i.e., what is appropriate according to the subject’s biographical history, including her sensibility, character trait, personality, and the contexts where those features are developed.
I am a JSD candidate at NYU. I also hold an LLM in legal theory from NYU and an LLB from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, where I also worked towards an MA in philosophy. I am interested in ethics, moral psychology, and questions of justice (and the normative significance and duties of individuals as such in the context of justice). My work mainly touches issues that tend to be at the intersection between morality and the law.
My dissertation presents a philosophical and legal analysis of remorse, what it is, and why (if at all) it matters morally (and legally). I focus on remorse as a moral emotion, and explore its significance in the private interpersonal realm (moral philosophy), and as a deeply personal phenomenon taken into consideration by The State in the public realm (political philosophy and jurisprudence).
I am a Ph.D. candidate at the University of Pennsylvania. I specialize in ethics (esp. normative ethics and metaethics) and epistemology. I also have secondary interests in philosophy of language, philosophy of action, and philosophy of religion.
My current research project is aimed at socializing moral epistemology. Much of this project is carried out in my dissertation. There I develop a novel account of the epistemic norm of moral assertion, which requires a moral asserter to have some degree of what I call moral appreciation and the ability to share some of this appreciation with her audience. In the process of defending this norm, I develop an account of moral appreciation, argue that it’s importantly distinct from current accounts of moral understanding, and argue that moral appreciation is the epistemic goal of moral inquiry. I then use my account of the norm of moral assertion to explain our aversion to moral deference and to defend moderate pessimism about moral deference.
While at CMPP, I will be developing my account of the conative and affective aspects of moral appreciation. I will also be exploring the relationship between having moral appreciation and being in a position to warrantedly blame others for their immoral behavior, even when one is not affected by this behavior.
I am a PhD candidate in the Philosophy Department at Northwestern University.
My dissertation focuses on some of the ways in which affective phenomenology is tied up with our representational capacities. The vast majority of work in this area has advanced one of the following two views: affect is largely irrelevant to the individuation and functioning of our representational capacities; affect is constitutive of some of our representations and is thereby necessary for their individuation and functioning. Very little attention has been given to the possibility that affect is irrelevant to the individuation of our representational capacities but central to their functioning in some instances. My research develops this line of thinking. I argue that emotional experiences do not have representational contents in their own right. Instead, emotional experience consists of the deployment of nonrepresentational predictive and inferential strategies that organize independently available representational contents.
I’m a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Philosophy at Rice University. I work mostly in Metaethics.
I earned an M.A. in Philosophy from Northern Illinois University in 2012, and my undergraduate degree was in Theology at as small college that does not exist anymore (I’m that old!).
My dissertation explores the concept of normative reasons and provides an Empiricist (broadly construed) analysis of how it is that we come to have such a concept. If the approach is sound, old and tired debates, such as that between Reasons Internalists and Reasons Externalists, turn out not to be quite as intractable as one might have thought.